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Geier v. American Honda Motor Company,
Inc. Has the Supreme Court Extended the
Pre-emption Doctrine Too Far?
JOSEPH MULHERIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Pre-emption, as demonstrated in this article and more
explicitly in the Supreme Court's varying opinions, is a dif-
ficult doctrine to understand and apply. Generally, pre-
emption occurs in situations where a state legislature has
concurrent power with the federal legislature, but is still
stripped of its legislative authority in a given area, regard-
less of whether the state and federal legislation conflict.1
Pre-emption issues are frequently litigated as evidenced by
the four pre-emption cases the Court heard during the
1999 session.2 Many believe that Geier v. American Honda
Motor Co., Inc.' was the most important pre-emption case
decided by the Court because of the decision's potentially
harmful effect on future pre-emption cases.4 Mark Levy, a
* The author is a second-year law student at Pepperdine University.
Many thanks to the staff of the Journal of the National Association of Ad-
ministration Law Judges for helping me to publish my first work. Even
greater thanks to my family for instilling the confidence and vision to ac-
complish any goal.
1. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Pre-emption, 79 CORNELL L. REv.
767, 771 (1994).
2. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (concluding that federal
regulations pre-empted a Washington state statute governing the design,
equipment, reporting and operation of oil tankers); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v.
Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000) (resolving that the federal law governing rail-
road crossings pre-empted state tort law for accidents between cars and
trains when federal money was used to install the warning signals); Crosby
v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding that congres-
sional sanctions against Burma pre-empted a state statute which restricted
state agencies from purchasing goods and services with those doing busi-
ness with Burma); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (de-
ciding that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 impli-
edly pre-empted common-law tort actions).
3. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
4. Marcia Coyle, High Court's Business Cases Heat Up: Airbag Pre-
emption Puts Term in Must-Watch Category, 158 N.J.L.J. 29, 29 (1999) (con-
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veteran Supreme Court litigator, commented, "Geier will tell
us more generally what the Court thinks about pre-
emption in a lot of areas. The general question of when
federal regulations pre-empt state laws goes well beyond
the airbag area ... the issue comes up routinely all around
the country."' Mr. Levy is likely correct because the deci-
sion could have major ramifications in automobile safety
requirements and other manufacturing areas where tort li-
ability is a major concern.6 Specifically, the Geier decision
could preclude manufacturers from common-law tort liabil-
ity in situations where a federal statute or administrative
standard regulates the technological development and
growth of a particular aspect of manufacturing a product.7
Additionally, the decision stands for the proposition that
the traditionally federalist majority of the Court, in holding
that an administrative standard could preclude a state
common-law tort suit, is not completely dedicated to its
federalist principles, or perhaps, these principles may be
different than commonly understood.8 This note will at-
tempt to reconcile the Court's decision in Geier with its
traditional federalist principles and the pre-emption doc-
trine generally.
Part II provides the historical background of the Court's
jurisprudence regarding the pre-emption doctrine.9 Part III
furnishes the procedural history and basic facts of the
case. 10 Part IV is a summary of the majority and dissenting
opinions and Part V analyzes these opinions.1 Part VI is a
eluding that both business and consumer organizations flagged Geier as
their highest stakes battle of the 1999 court term).
5. Id.
6. Infra Part VI.B.
7. Michael Greve, Upcoming Clash Between Federalism and Pre-emption
is Foretold in the Geier v. American Honda Opinions, 161 N.J.L.J. 715, 715
(2000) (claiming that "manufacturers - and their shareholders, customers
and insurers - escaped the imposition of massive liabilities by the skin of
their teeth").
8. Infra Part VI.D. See generally Greve, supra note 7, at 715 (conclud-
ing that in deciding Geier, the price of releasing state tort law to run ram-
pant was too big a risk for the traditional federalists on the Court).
9. See discussion infra Part II.
10. See discussion infra Part III.
11. See discussion infra Parts IV-V.
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discussion of the impact the Geier decision could have on:
(1) plaintiffs seeking redress for harm caused by manufac-
turers; (2) the liability of manufacturers; (3) the presump-
tion against pre-emption; and (4) the Court.12 Part VII con-
cludes the article by holding that the Majority's decision
was a hiccup from its traditionally federalist position that
will negatively impact the pre-emption doctrine and, most
importantly, close the door to many injured citizens of the
United States who seek redress.'3
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. General Background
While the Court is struggling to solidify the pre-emption
doctrine, certain fundamental parts of the doctrine remain
static. 14 Pre-emption is fundamentally rooted in the Su-
premacy Clause's language that the Constitution, treaties,
and valid federal statutes "shall be the supreme Law of the
land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary withstanding." i" Under the umbrella of the
Supremacy Clause, the Court classifies pre-emption as ei-
ther express or implied."i Express pre-emption occurs
when a federal statute explicitly states a certain type of
state law shall be pre-empted. 7 For implied pre-emption,
12. See discussion infra Part VI.
13. See discussion infra Part VII.
14. Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Pre-emption of
State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U.L. REv. 559, 559 (1997) (describing the Court's
changing analysis of pre-emption as "schizophrenic").
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. But see Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 769
(arguing that pre-emption has "little if anything to do with the Supremacy
Clause").
16. Caleb Nelson, Pre-emption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225, 226 (2000) (defining
the three types of pre-emption as "express pre-emption," [implied] "field"
pre-emption" and "conflict" pre-emption).
17. See id.; see also English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79
(1990) (stating that pre-emption "is a question of congressional intent, see
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co, 485 U.S. 293, 299 (1988), and when
Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory language");
Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (holding that a federal statute
"'cover[ed] the subject matter' of the adequacy of warning devices installed
175
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the Court maintains two sub-categories: field pre-emption
and conflict pre-emption. 8 Under "field" pre-emption, a
state statute is superceded when a federal statute wholly
occupies a particular field and takes away state power to
supplement it. 19 "Conflict" pre-emption occurs when com-
pliance with both the federal and state statute is impossi-
ble, and the state law stands as an obstacle to the legisla-
tive objectives of Congress.2 °
B. Case History
The recent influx of pre-emption cases is not indicative of
the doctrine's controversial history of limited use and mis-
understanding. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court did not
clearly explain the pre-emption doctrine or utilize it until
the early 1900's, opting instead to decide prior pre-emption
cases on other grounds.21 Before the first state law was
with the participation of federal funds and thereby pre-empted a common-
law tort action").
18. Nelson, supra note 16, at 227-28.
19. English, 496 U.S. at 79, citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000)
(concluding that federal regulations occupied the "field" governing the de-
sign, equipment, reporting and operation of oil tankers).
20. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-
43 (1963); see also Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co. 529 U.S. 861 (2000)
(holding that common-law tort actions would obstruct the objectives Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (208); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council,
530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding that a Massachusetts law frustrated the pur-
pose and effect of Congress's economic sanctions against Burma).
21. See Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 787. See also Houston v. Moore,
18 U.S. I (1820) (answering the question of whether a state overstepped its
power in enacting legislation and deciding that a state had concurrent
power to punish an insubordinate militiaman); Willson v. Black-bird Creek
Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245 (1829) (deciding that the Dormant Commerce
Clause and the Supremacy Clause were the only constitutional principles
that could invalidate a state statute which supposedly conflicted with the
power of the United States to regulate commerce); City of New York v. Miln,
36 U.S. 102 (1837) (holding that a New York statute was not an interference
on the part of the state with commerce between the port of New York and
foreign ports because the state had the appropriate police power to promul-
gate the statute). The Dormant Commerce Clause is "the constitutional
principle that the Commerce Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. cl. 3) prevents
state regulation of interstate commercial activity even when Congress has
not acted under its Commerce Clause power to regulate that activity."
BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 1344 (7th ed. 1999).
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pre-empted in 1912, the Justices considered whether Con-
gress even had the power to pre-empt.22 When the Court
fimally acknowledged the validity of the doctrine, it was out
of necessity; Congress's creation of regulatory agencies un-
der the Commerce Clause was creating serious questions
as to the diminution of the traditional powers of the state.23
The Court's early attempts to explain the doctrine acknowl-
edged that pre-emption could be either express or implied,
but most of these early cases were decided under "occupa-
tion of a field" pre-emption.2 4 The issue became prevalent
as the United States attempted to deal with the "rapid
growth of federal regulation and the perceived need for uni-
form national laws."2" One commentator described this
early "occupation of field" doctrine as "automatic, based on
a new jurisdictional concept of latent exclusivity," meaning
that "occupation of field pre-emption" rendered any analy-
sis of congressional intent unnecessary.26 Nevertheless,
the Court began to shy away from this early doctrine, real-
izing that its own analysis was unclear.
After years of confusion and inconsistency, the Court fi-
nally took a step toward clarifying the pre-emption doctrine
in the 1912 case Savage v. Jones.2 7 In addressing whether
the Federal Food and Drug Act pre-empted an Indiana
statute requiring the publication of certain items on animal
22. Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 788. In researching the history of pre-
emption, Stephen Gardbaum failed to find the word "pre-empt" in the U.S.
Reports before 1917. Instead, the word "superceded" was used to describe
pre-emption as we know it today. Id. at 815 n.65.
23. Id. at 787.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 801.
26. Id. at 802, 806. Stephen Gardbaum noted three unique character-
istics of the early "occupation of field" pre-emption doctrine. First, pre-
emption was an automatic result of congressional action in that when the
states and the government had concurrent power, the federal law automati-
cally pre-empted the state law. Id. Second, Congress had "latent exclusiv-
ity," referring to the notion that states had the power to act until Congress
exercised its inherent power under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 802. Fi-
nally, pre-emption was seen as a result of the "paramount power" of the
Supremacy Clause. Id.
27. Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912). See also Susan Raeker-
Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption that Never Was: Pre-emption Doctrine
Swallows the Rule, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 1379, 1384 (1998) (claiming that Savage
v. Jones set forth the basic principles of express and implied pre-emption).
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food labels, the Court capitalized on the opportunity to ex-
plain the basic principles of implied and express pre-
emption.28 The Court explained that "[ilf the purpose of the
act cannot otherwise be accomplished - if its operation
within its chosen field must else be frustrated and its pro-
visions be refused their natural effect - the state law must
yield to the regulation of Congress within its sphere of dele-
gated power. ' 9 One commentator viewed Savage as the
basis for the presumption against pre-emption because of
the Court's requirement that Congress manifest the intent
to pre-empt.3 °
Years later in Hines v. Davidowitz,31 the Court attempted
to clarify the pre-emption doctrine further.32 In Hines, an
obstacle pre-emption case, a Pennsylvania statute con-
flicted with Congress's Alien Registration Act of 1940.33
The Pennsylvania state statute required aliens to register
with the state once a year, to carry an identification card at
all times, and to be prepared to show the card whenever it
was demanded by a police officer or federal official.34 The
conflicting federal statute required no identification card.35
In response, the Court stated:
[Wihere the federal government, in the exer-
cise of its superior authority in this field, has
enacted a complete scheme of regulation and
has therein provided a standard for the regis-
tration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently
with the purpose of Congress, conflict or inter
28. Savage, 225 U.S. at 521.
29. Id. at 533.
30. Raeker-Jordan, supra note 27, at 1385.
31. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
32. Raeker-Jordan, supra note 27, at 1385 (deeming Hines the "gene-
sis" for the current doctrine).
33. Hines, 312 U.S. at 61.
34. Id. at 59-61. The Pennsylvania state act also subjected aliens to
$100 fine or imprisonment if they failed to register. See id. at 59, 60. Also,
for failing to show one's identification card, the aliens could be fined ten
dollars or placed in jail for ten days. See id. at 60.
35. Id.
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fere with, curtail or complement, the federal
law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regula-
tions.36
The Alien Registration Act of 1940 contained no express
provision providing for pre-emption of state law, but the
Court found that the national scheme for aliens pre-
empted the state law by implication.37
C. The Modem Doctrine
Unlike the early doctrine, which was "automatic and
based on a new jurisdictional concept of latent exclusiv-
ity,"a3 the central issue in all modern pre-emption cases is
the determination of whether Congress truly intended fed-
eral law to supercede state law.39 Congress's intention can
be either implied or expressed.4 ° A key factor in the mod-
em intent-centric analysis is the "presumption against pre-
emption," which the Court first recognized in Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corporation.4 1 The Court created this important
limitation in stating that pre-emption analysis starts "with
the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
[are] not to be superceded by [a] Federal Act unless that [is]
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."4 2 This simply
means that if Congress wants to pre-empt a state statute,
36. Id. at 66-67.
37. Id. at 74.
38. Savage, 225 U.S. at 521.
39. Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 806. Likewise, the critical issue in
Geier is what Congress intended when it wrote an express pre-emption pro-
vision into the 1996 National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
(NTMVSA). See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867 (2000).
40. Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 806.
41. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
42. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. The statutory conflict was between the
United States Warehouse Act (federal statute) and an Illinois statute regu-
lating warehousemen and warehousing. Congress legislated in an area that
was traditionally occupied by the States. Nevertheless, the Court looked to
the legislative history of the Act and found that Congress occupied the field
of warehousemen and warehousing, so the states could not act without ob-
structing the federal plan. The Court found that Congress intended to have
only one system of regulation and to occupy the field. In a fashion very
similar to Geier, the Court ignored the express statutory language and
found that there was an obstruction to pre-emption, thus ignoring the pre-
sumption against pre-emption.
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it should explicitly state it in the congressional act.43
As recently as the 1980s, the Court seemed dedicated to
the presumption against pre-emption which ensured that
citizens had a means of seeking compensation in common-
law tort suits." The Court suggested that if no alternative
compensatory remedy was available, a strong presumption
against pre-emption of tort claims was appropriate.4 5
Compensation for the injured citizens and federalism prin-
ciples were the driving reasons for the Court's adherence to
the presumption.46 The Court confirmed its dedication to
the presumption against pre-emption in English v. General
Electric Co.47 In English, the Court unanimously decided
that an employee's state common-law claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress was not pre-empted despite
the federal occupation of the field of nuclear safety.48 The
Court stated that "[ilt is undisputed that Congress has not
explicitly pre-empted petitioner's state-law tort action by
inserting specific pre-emptive language into any of its en-
actments governing the nuclear industry."4 9 Again the
Court seemed dedicated to the idea that, without specific
congressional intent, there could be no pre-emption.5 0
The Court's adherence to the presumption against pre-
emption ended shortly after English.5 In Cippollone v. Lig-
43. Raeker-Jordan, supra note 27, at 1382 (asserting that "absent the
requisite clear and unambiguous pre-emptive language," courts should
abide by the presumption against pre-emption). Judging by the deference
given Congress in Geier and its progeny, a great deal of deference is given to
Congress and its power to pre-empt a state statute.
44. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984). See also
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 236-40 (1985)
(holding that the Nonintercourse Act did not pre-empt any common-law ac-
tions).
45. Grey, supra note 14, at 563.
46. Id.
47. 496 U.S. 72 (1990).
48. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990).
49. Id. at 80.
50. Id. at 86. The Court based its decision heavily on the Silkwood de-
cision because both cases related to radiation-based injuries. Id. at 85.
51. The Court's shallow roots regarding the presumption against pre-
emption could be attributed to the fact that both English and Silkwood oc-
curred in the nuclear regulatory area.
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gett, Inc., 2 the Court considered whether a 1969 act requir-
ing warning labels on cigarette packaging or its 1965
predecessor act pre-empted state common-law tort claims
against a cigarette manufacturer.5 3 The Court held that the
1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act54 did
not pre-empt any common-law claims, but held that the
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 196955 did pre-empt
some claims.56 The Court based its decision on the express
pre-emption provision in the 1969 Act, stating that "[n]o
requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health
shall be imposed under State law with respect to the adver-
tising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which
are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act."
57
The Court seemingly abandoned the "presumption against
pre-emption," by finding pre-emption against the tort
claims even if the intent was not specifically stated in the
statute.58
The Cippollone decision, in addition to weakening the
presumption against pre-emption, also created two pre-
emption rules.59 First, the Court ordered that any statute
pre-empting state police regulations be read narrowly in
light of the presumption against pre-emption. 6° By "nar-
rowly," the Court meant that if the intent is not clear and
manifest in the words of the statute, the Court may not in-
52. 505 U.S. 504 (1991).
53. Cippollone v. Liggett, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 508 (1991). Ironically,
Justice Stevens wrote the plurality decision in favor of pre-emption.
54. Pub. L. No 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1333-1341 (1994)).
55. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994)).
56. Cippollone, 505 U.S. at 529.
57. Id. at 515 (holding that when Congress has considered the issue of
pre-emption and has included in the enacted legislation an explicit pre-
emption provision, and the provision provides "a reliable indicium of con-
gressional intent with respect to state authority, there is no need to infer
congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions
of legislature").
58. Id. at 530-31.
59. Id. at 545.
60. Id. at 518. Scalia dissented, writing that the statute should be in-
terpreted under "ordinary principles of statutory construction." Id. at 545
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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quire any further into the express language for an implied
intent."1 Secondly, the Court stated that when an express
pre-emption provision is a satisfactorily reliable indicia of
congressional intent, the Court need not look to the sub-
stantive provisions for implied pre-emption.62 In response
to the Court's altered pre-emption analysis in Cippollone,
lower courts had difficulty applying the Court's new pre-
emption analysis.6 3 In fact, many lower courts interpreted
Cippollone as an expansion of the pre-emption defense and
a mandate to continue pre-emption analysis no further
than an express pre-emption clause.'
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr," the Court's second most re-
cent state tort law pre-emption case before Geier, the Court
experienced a slight case of schizophrenia and held that a
plaintiffs claims were not pre-empted.6" Justice Stevens,
the author of the dissent in Geier and the plurality in Cip-
pollone, wrote for the Majority." The Court addressed
whether the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) of 197668
pre-empted a state negligence action for a defective pace-
maker.69 The manufacturer argued that the claims were
pre-empted by an express pre-emption provision in the
statute, but Justice Stevens emphasized the importance of
the presumption against pre-emption using the pro-victim
rhetoric from Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee.7 ° Justice Stevens
61. Raeker-Jordan, supra note 24, at 1414-15.
62. Cippollone, 505 U.S. at 519. Scalia also dissented on this issue,
stating that a valid express pre-emption provision should not foreclose the
possibility of finding implied pre-emption. Id. at 548 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Grey, supra note 14, at 580-8 1.
64. Id. In Freightliner v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995), the Court de-
clared that the lower courts had in fact overreacted to Cippollone. As a re-
sult, the Court attempted to correct the pre-emption analysis by removing
the rule that express and implied pre-emption could not co-exist. Id. at 288-
89. The Court refused to accept a claim that the NTMVSA of 1966 pre-
empted a stated design defect for a failure to install antilock braking sys-
tems in eighteen-wheelers and ruled for the plaintiff. Id. at 289-90.
65. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
66. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 503 (1996).
67. Id. at 474.
68. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§
360C-360K, 379, 379(a) & 42 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994)).
69. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 474.
70. Id. at 485. "Start with the assumption that the historic police pow-
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examined the congressional intent in creating the statute
and concluded that the MDA's purpose was consumer pro-
tection.71 He attempted to weaken future pre-emption de-
fenses by restricting pre-emption only to situations "where
a particular state requirement threatens to interfere with a
specific federal interest,"72 but Justice Stevens's addition to
the pre-emption analysis has not been widely accepted.73
D. Pre-emption in Administrative Law
In the case of United States v. Shimer,74 the Court ad-
dressed the pre-emptive effect of an administrative regula-
tion for the first time.75 In answering whether a Veterans'
Administration's regulation for guaranteeing a loan pre-
empted Pennsylvania law, the Court decided that the "Ser-
viceman's Readjustment Act authorized the Veteran's Ad-
ministrator to displace state law by establishing[] exclusive
procedures."76 The Court affirmatively held that an admin-
istrative regulation can pre-empt a state law.77
The Court, however, failed to address two key issues in
Shimer which the Court later addressed in Fidelity Federal
Savings.& Loan Ass'n. v. De La Cuesta.78 (1) what Congress
must authorize to give agencies pre-emptive power; and (2)
whether regulatory pre-emption cases should be analyzed
ers of the States [arel not to be superceded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." (quoting Hillsborough
County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1985)). See
also Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251 (stating that it is "difficult to believe that
Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial resources
for those injured by illegal conduct").
71. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 ("The purpose of Congress is the ulti-
mate touchstone in every pre-emption case.") (quoting Cippollone, 505 U.S.
at 516).
72. Id. at 472.
73. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
74. 367 U.S. 374 (1961).
75. United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 377-79 (1961). See also
Damien Marshall, The Application of Chevron Deference in Regulatory Pre-
emption Cases, 87 GEO. L.J. 263, 270 (1998) (describing the development of
the pre-emption doctrine in administrative regulations).
76. Shimer, 367 U.S. at 377-81.
77. Id.
78. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
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differently than federal statutory pre-emption cases.7 9 In
De la Cuesta, the Court addressed the pre-emptive effect of
a Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulation.8 0 The court
clarified that "[flederal regulations have no less pre-emptive
effect than federal statutes,"8 concluding that regulatory
pre-emption does not require "express congressional au-
thorization to displace state law." 2 In answering whether
regulatory and statutory pre-emption cases were to be
treated the same, the Court, in a circular fashion, referred
to Shimer when they stated, "[wihere Congress has directed
an administrator to exercise his discretion, his judgments
are subject to judicial review only to determine whether he
has exceeded his statutory authority or acted arbitrarily."83
The Shimer and De la Cuesta cases were crucial to the
Geier decision because (1) the decision affirmatively
adopted pre-emption of state laws by administrative regula-
tions, and (2) restricted the amount of scrutiny allowed
when questioning an administrative regulation.
III. FACTS OF THE CASE, GEIER V. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR Co.
In 1992, Alexis Geier spun out and collided with a tree
while driving her 1987 Honda Accord.84 Geier suffered
multiple serious injuries in the crash, arguably more seri-
ous than if the car was equipped with a driver's side air-
bag. 5 Geier, a minor at the time, and her parents sued
under District of Columbia tort law claiming that Honda
negligently and defectively designed the car because it
lacked a driver's side airbag. 86 The district court dismissed
the claim because Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
79. Marshall, supra note 75, at 270 (1998).
80. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 144. The Board was vested with the au-
thority to administer the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933. Id.
81. Id. at 153.
82. Id. at 154.
83. Id. at 153-54 (citing Shimer, 367 U.S. at 381-82).
84. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 861 (2000).
85. Brief for Petitioner at 12, Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529
U.S. 861 (2000) (No. 98-1811) (1999 WL 966532).
86. Geier, 529 U.S. at 865.
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(FMVSS or Standard) 208,87 as promulgated by the De-
partment of Transportation (DOT) under the authority of
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVA
or Safety Act) of 1966,88 expressly pre-empted the lawsuit.89
The district court felt that the lawsuit attempted to estab-
lish an airbag requirement that was inapposite to FMVSS
208.90 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld
the district court's dismissal and ruled for Honda, reason-
ing that state law tort claims presented obstacles to the ac-
complishments of FMVSS 208's objectives.91
IV. ANALYSIS OF OPINION
A. Majority
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court,92 fram-
ing the key issue as, "whether the Act [National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966] pre-empts a state com-
mon-law tort action in which the plaintiff claims that the
defendant auto manufacturer, who was in compliance with
the standard, should nonetheless have equipped a 1987
87. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1996). FMVSS 208 required manufacturers to
phase-in either automatic seat belts or airbags over time. Cars manufac-
tured on or after September 1, 1989, but before September 1, 1996, were to
be equipped with a passive restraint system for both front seat positions. 49
C.F.R. § 571.208, S4.1.2.1. Between September 1, 1996 and August 31,
1997, manufacturers were expected to have passive restraint systems for
ninety-five percent of the cars manufactured. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208,
S4.1.5.2.1. All cars manufactured after September 1, 1997, are required to
be equipped with air bags at both the driver's and front right passenger's
seating positions. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, S4.1.5.3.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (now recodified as the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration Authorization Act of 1991, 49 U.S.C. § 30101 (1994)).
The statute was enacted for "reduc[ing] traffic accidents and deaths and in-
juries [to persons] resulting from traffic accidents." To accomplish this
purpose, Congress could "prescribe motor vehicle safety standards."
89. Geier, 529 U.S. at 865.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 863. (Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy,
J.J., joined in the Majority opinion).
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automobile with airbags."9 3 In holding that the "no airbag"
lawsuit conflicted with the objectives of FMVSS 208, Jus-
tice Breyer addressed three separate questions. First, does
the Act's express pre-emption provision pre-empt Geier's
lawsuit? Second, do ordinary pre-emption principles ap-
ply, and third, does the Geier's airbag lawsuit actually con-
flict with FMVSS 208?"4
1. Whether the Express Provision in the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 Pre-empts the
Common-law Tort Action?
Under a narrow reading95 of the Safety Act's pre-emption
clause,9 6 the Majority found that there was no convincing
indication that Congress wanted to pre-empt common-law
state tort actions. 97 Justice Breyer could not reconcile this
supposition without considering the effect of the Safety
Standard's savings clause.98 The Court stated that, with-
out the savings clause, a broad reading might favor pre-
emption because of the conflict between the goals of
FMVSS 208 and common-law tort actions. 99 Instead, the
Majority decided that there are "a significant number of
93. Id. at 865.
94. Id. at 867.
95. The narrow reading of the statute was established in Cippollone,
505 U.S. at 505. The Court has since required that there be a narrow read-
ing when analyzing an express pre-emption situation.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (West 1988).
Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this
subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have
any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to
any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard
applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of
equipment which is not identical to the Federal Standard. Id.
97. Geier, 529 U.S. at 868.
98. Id. A savings clause is "[a] statutory provision exempting from cov-
erage something that would otherwise be included. [It] is generally used in
a repealing act to preserve rights and claims that would otherwise be lost."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1344 (7th ed. 1999). Here, the savings clause, 15
U.S.C. § 1397(k) (renumbered to 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e)) says, "[clompliance
with a motor vehicle safety standard.., does not exempt a person from li-
ability at common-law."
99. Id.
Spring 2001Geier v. American Honda Motor Company, Inc.
common-law liability cases to save,""1 ° and with a court-
imposed requirement to read the standard narrowly, there
could be no express pre-emption. 101
2. Whether Implied Pre-emption Principles Apply.
In considering whether there was a valid implied pre-
emption defense, the Majority addressed whether the sav-
ings clause, in addition to allowing common-law tort ac-
tions under express pre-emption, accomplished the same
for field and implied pre-emption. 10 2 The Court looked at
two main factors: the language of the savings clause0 3 and
Congress's level of articulation as to whether common-law
tort claims were specifically to be saved.104 The Court con-
cluded that "[nothing in the language of the savings clause
suggests an intent to save state law tort actions that con-
flict with federal regulations."10 5 The Majority reasoned
that if Congress intended to save all state law tort claims,
regardless of their overall effect on the objectives of FMVSS
208, Congress would have specifically stated this posi-
tion. 10
6
The dissent proposed that there should be a special
pleading burden beyond the regular burden for ordinary
pre-emption.' °7 The Majority, agreeing with the court of
appeals, dismissed the special pleading burden by reading
the savings and pre-emption provisions as creating a neu-
tral policy.0 8 The Court justified its creation of the neutral
100. Id. at 868.
101. Id. Interestingly, the court acknowledged that where a federal law
creates a minimum safety standard, the state tort laws can act. But see id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the NTMVS Act actually only creates a
minimum standard and thus, state law tort actions should not be pre-
empted).
102. Id. at 869. (acknowledging that the Court declined to address this
issue in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995)).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k).
104. Geier, 529 U.S. at 869.
105. Id. (reasoning that the words in the savings clause, particularly
compliance" and "does not exempt" simply bar a defense that compliance
with the FMVSS automatically exempts a defendant from state law).
106. Id. at 870.
107. Id. (citing Stevens, J., dissenting at 886-913).
108. Id. at 870-71.
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policy by reasoning that it would ensure a single uniform
set of federal safety standards within the industry. 10 9 The
savings clause, according to the Majority, would "stand as
an 'obstacle' to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress."1 The Court
failed to recognize any intent expressed by Congress in the
statute that either justified the application of the savings
clause to implied pre-emption or added a special pleading
burden requirement."' Accordingly, the Majority reasoned
that if Congress wanted to avoid using ordinary pre-
emption principles when there was an actual conflict, they
would have said so." 2
3. Whether a "No Airbag" Common-law Tort Action
Actually Conflicts With FMVSS 208.
The Court decided that common-law tort actions would
create a mandatory airbag requirement that would ulti-
mately stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of
FMVSS 208's objectives" 3 of gradually developing a mix of
alternative passive restraint devices for safety-related rea-
sons." 4  This objective did not create a minimum airbag
standard or a requirement for airbags, but only suggested
that airbags were part of the larger passive restraint pro-
gram."' The Court laid out seven considerations that the
109. Id. The Court struggles with the importance of the savings clause.
The Court acknowledged its validity in saving common-law tort actions from
the express pre-emption provision and also the usefulness of the safety
standard in "providing necessary compensation to victims." See id. at 871.
However, the Court abides to a neutral reading of the pre-emption provision
and the savings provision, essentially eliminating the value of the savings
clause for field and implied pre-emption.
110. Id. at 873. See also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)
(framing the question as to whether Pennsylvania state law stands as an
obstacle to, "the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and ob-
jectives of Congress").
111. Id. at 869-72.
112. Id. at 872.
113. Id. at 886.
114. Id. (explaining that the benefits of FMVSS 208 would be lowering
costs, overcoming technical difficulties, encouraging technological develop-
ment, and winning widespread consumer acceptance).
115. Id. at 874.
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DOT claimed helped them formulate FMVSS 208.116 With
these considerations in mind, the DOT felt that a gradual
phase-in of passive restraints would allow manufacturers
and regulators more time to develop the best mix of safety
restraints and ease public acceptance of several new tech-
nologies. 117
In evaluating the objectives of FMVSS 208, the Majority
reasoned that deference must be given to the DOT and its
secretary.1 1 8 Because the DOT and its secretary believed
that the common-law tort actions would pose an obstacle
to accomplishing their goals, common-law tort actions were
to be pre-empted." 9 The Court stated:
Congress has delegated to DOT authority to
implement the statute; the subject matter is
technical; and the relevant history and back-
ground are complex and extensive. The agency
is likely to have a thorough understanding of
its own regulation and its objectives and is
"uniquely qualified to comprehend the likely
impact of state requirements."
120
After finding that there was proper delegation, the Court
gave deference to the agency's and secretary's position and
held that the state tort law would stand as an obstacle to
the attainment of these positions.'
21
116. Id. at 877-78. (the considerations were that: (1) Buckled up seat-
belts are necessary for safety; (2) more than 80% of front seat passengers
were not buckling their manual seatbelts; (3) airbags could not entirely pro-
tect the unbuckled passenger as airbags by themselves were less effective
than manual lap and shoulder belts; (4) passive restraint systems had other
disadvantages such as customer dissatisfaction and discomfort; (5) airbags
were dangerous to children and "out-of-position occupants;" (6) airbags
were expensive; and (7) generally, the public might not use the passive re-
straints because of cost, fear or, physical intrusiveness).
117. Id. at 879.
118. Id. at 883. See also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 512 U.S. 470, 512
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[I]t is not
certain that an agency regulation determining the pre-emptive effect of any
federal statute is entitled to deference.") (Emphasis in original).
119. Id. at 886.
120. Id. at 883.
121. Id. at 886.
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B. Dissent
'This is a case about federalism, that is about respect for
the constitutional role of the States as sovereign entities."1 22
Commentators differ as to whether this case is about fed-
eralism or something different, but what is clear is that in
order to find pre-emption, the Majority was forced to ad-
dress many tough administrative law issues. 123  Accord-
ingly, Justice Stevens's dissent addressed the issue of fed-
eralism and the states' historic police powers to protect
their citizens, as well as the pre-emption doctrine as it re-
lates to an administrative standard.'2 4 With these two ma-
jor issues controlling the tone of the dissent, Justice Ste-
vens addressed Honda's pre-emption defense: (1) the Safety
Act's safety pre-emption provision expressly pre-empts
Geier's common-law "no airbag claims;" and (2) the airbag
claims are impliedly pre-empted because the imposition of
liability in cases such as Geier would frustrate the pur-
poses of 208.125
Before rebutting Honda's arguments, Justice Stevens
provided his own history of FMVSS 208, depicting the
promulgation of the rule as a disorganized, unstructured
process. 121 Justice Stevens went so far as to construct a
version of the FMVSS which encompassed what he thought
122. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 726 (1991); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999)).
123. Geier, 529 U.S. at 884-86. See also infra note 256.
124. Geier, 529 U.S. at 886-913 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 895-905.
126. Id. at 888-92. The first version of the standard was issued in
1967 requiring the installation of manual seatbelts. In 1977, the DOT
amended the standard to require passive restraints (either an airbag or
automatic seatbelts) in all cars by model year 1984. At all times the various
editions of the rule were promulgated as exemplified by the 60 rulemaking
notices. As a result of a deregulatory initiative of the Reagan Administration
in 1981, the Secretary initially delayed the effective date of the 1977 stan-
dard, but then rescinded the program. The Court in Motor Vehicle Manufac-
turers Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), ruled that this rescission was arbitrary and capri-
cious. After the ruling, Elizabeth Dole, through proper rulemaking proce-
dures, amended FMVSS 208 to a format requiring the gradual installation
of passive restraint devices starting in 1984. The standard was amended
most recently in 1991, with the Secretary mandating that all automobiles
be equipped with passive restraints by 1998.
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the standard should have been, had Congress pre-empted
common-law tort actions.'2 7 Justice Stevens interpreted
the standard as failing to provide "any... specific evidence
of an intent to preclude common-law tort actions."1 28 Thus,
where no intent is evident, the dissenters hold that the
state's historic police powers cannot be divested. There-
fore, because tort remedies are a part of these powers, they
cannot be impliedly pre-empted. 1
29
1. The Safety Act's Safety Pre-emption Provision
Expressly Pre-empts Petitioner's Common-law "No Airbag"
Claims.
Recognizing that the Supremacy Clause causes a state
law to concede to a conflicting federal law, the dissent ar-
gued that the Court is giving the lower courts "carte
blanche to use federal law as a means of imposing their
own ideas of tort reform ... ."'30 According to the dissent,
for a state law within a state's historic police powers to be
pre-empted, Congress must express a clear and manifest
purpose in a federal statute. 131 In an attempt to find Con-
gress's clear and manifest purpose, Justice Stevens called
for a plain reading of the statute to interpret the intent of
the statute. 3 2 Refusing to read the statute as a neutral
policy, Justice Stevens could not find any specific intent to
pre-empt, basing his finding on the interpretation of the
term "safety standard" in the express pre-emption provi-
sion. ' Honda interpreted safety standards as comprised
of any judicial rulings on the common-law "no airbag"
claims that would thereby establish a safety standard dif-
127. Id. at 887-88.
128. Id. at 892.
129. Greve, supra note 7, at 3. (stating that the liberal Justices Ste-
vens, Souter, and Ginsburg fiercely oppose federalism in constitutional
cases, where it tends to confine regulation, but holding that these Justices
will welcome more expansive states' rights in pre-emption cases).
130. Geier, 529 U.S. at 894 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (citing Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (1996)).
132. Id. at 895 (citing CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658,
664 (1993)).
133. Id.
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ferent from 208.3 "[Slafety standard" for Justice Stevens
is an administrative rule and not "a case-specific decision
by judges."'3 5 Because common-law tort actions could not
be found under a "plain meaning" reading, Justice Stevens
found that common-law actions are therefore not expressly
pre-empted by the words of the FMVSS 208.136
In order to accomplish a "plain meaning" reading, Justice
Stevens conceded that the Court held in three previous de-
cisions that common-law tort actions were pre-empted. 137
The dissent distinguished these cases concluding that the
statutes in these cases were much broader and did not
contain a savings clause.'3 8 Further, the language of 15
U.S.C. § 1392(d) (the pre-emption clause) clearly failed to
express an intent to pre-empt and 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (the
savings clause) clearly expressed an intent to save com-
mon-law tort claims. 139 Thus, Justice Stevens felt that the
Court ignored the plain meaning and "read[] the savings
clause out of the statute altogether." 140
2. The Airbag Claims are Impliedly Pre-empted Because
the Imposition of Liability in Cases Such as This Would
Frustrate the Purposes of FMVSS 208.
In its amicus brief supporting Honda, the United States
argued that had the manufacturers known in 1984 that
they might later be liable for failing to install airbags, the
manufacturers would have installed airbags in all cars.14 '
134. Id. at 896 (stating that the express pre-emption provision prohibits
the promulgation of any safety standard dealing with the same aspect of
performance and not identical to the Federal standard).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. See also Cippollone v. Liggett, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 548-49(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that
common-law tort actions were expressly pre-empted); CSX Transp., 507
U.S. at 664 (concluding that a negligence suit was pre-empted by the lan-
guage of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970); Medtronic, 518 U.S. at
502-03 (deciding that the statutory reference to "any requirement" may in-
clude common-law duties).
138. Geier, 529 U.S. at 897 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 897-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 898 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 901 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens retorted with three counter-arguments.14 2
First, the pre-1984 risk of liability did not compel manufac-
turers to install airbags, so the fact that there was a stan-
dard addressing the installation of airbags did not increase
the liability. 143  Second, tort liability would be an after
thought because the standard would already be imple-
mented by the time liability became an issue. 144 Tort liabil-
ity would not frustrate the Secretary's desire to encourage
better passive restraint systems and customer satisfaction
because of the great length of time that passes from the fil-
ing of negligence suits and a court's decisions.14 Third, in
response to the Majority's assertion that "the savings
clause preserves those actions seeking to establish a better
than minimum standard," Justice Stevens held that the
Safety Act merely imposed a minimum requirement. 41 In
total, Justice Stevens stated that he could not find a clear
expression of FMVSS 208's policies that would be frus-
trated by the common-law suits. 14
After failing to find any policy that would be impeded by
a common-law tort suit, Justice Stevens called for a
stronger adherence to the "presumption against pre-
142. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens admitted that even if
Standard 208 did not create a pre-emption defense, it reduced the likeli-
hood of manufacturer liability because the manufacturers could point to
compliance to nullify negligence claims.
144. Id. at 901-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In footnote 18, Justice Ste-
vens rebukes the Majority, explaining that they misunderstood him on this
point. Specifically, the suit for negligent and defective design of a car is not
limited to the duty to install an airbag. Rather, it is a violation of the gen-
eral duty to provide an automobile with an airbag or a reasonable substi-
tute. Therefore, the Majority was wrong to assume that only the installation
of an airbag would enable a manufacturer to avoid liability. Id. at 903 n. 18
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 902 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer wrote that "a reading of
the express pre-emption provision that excludes common-law actions gives
actual meaning to the clause's literal meaning, while leaving adequate room
for state law to operate - where the federal law creates only a floor, i.e., a
minimum safety standard." Id. at 868. Ironically, the Safety Act defines
"safety standard" as "a minimum standard for motor vehicle equipment per-
formance, which is practicable, which meets the needs for motor vehicle
safety and which provides objective criteria." Id. at 889. Because it is a
minimum standard, common-law tort actions would be allowed.
147. Id. at 904 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1L93
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emption. 1 48  The dissent believed that Honda had not
crossed the high threshold created by the presumption
against pre-emption of a state law.'49 They argued that the
presumption against pre-emption could not be defeated
when the standard clearly lacks the intent needed to dis-
place state law."15 Justice Stevens believed that the pre-
sumption against pre-emption was an important safeguard
because the presumption: (1) demands that Congress
speaks clearly when limiting the areas of traditional state
regulation; and (2) prevents federal judges from applying
implied pre-emption too loosely. 151
The dissent felt that the presumption was even more
crucial when addressing the pre-emptive force of an admin-
istrative regulation. 5 2 Justice Stevens felt that when the
DOT intended to pre-empt with Standard 208, the states
and the agencies should have engaged in normal notice-
and-comment rulemaking procedures.'13  Justice Stevens
believed the standard violated these procedures because
there was no specific intent in the standard to pre-empt a
state law, nor were the states given notice that a standard
would pre-empt common-law tort actions. 154 Justice Ste-
vens also felt that the standards should have been given no
deference per Chevron."' Instead, he believed a weaker
148. Id. at 906 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 907 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens believes that the doc-
trine of implied pre-emption has been "inadequately considered" and is per-
haps not supported by the text or history of the Supremacy Clause. See
also Nelson, supra note 16, at 231-32 (asserting that "under the Supremacy
Clause, pre-emption occurs if and only if state law contradicts a valid rule
established by federal law, and the mere fact that the federal law serves cer-
tain purposes does not automatically mean that it contradicts everything
that might get in the way...").
152. Geier, 529 U.S. at 908-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that
"the Court identifies no case in which we have upheld a regulatory claim of
frustration-of-purposes implied conflict pre-emption based on nothing more
than an ex post administrative litigating position and inferences from regu-
latory history and final commentary").
153. Id. at 910 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 911 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See infra note 164 (explaining
that when a Court cannot find delegatory intent, the delegation, per Chev-
ron, is assumed because of the "gap" of statutory silence or ambiguity).
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standard of deference was more appropriate considering
that the standard was created from an informal policy
plan." 6  Justice Stevens wrote that deference to FMVSS
208 could only be given after formal notice-and-comment
rulemaking.'5 7 Only then could the standard satisfy the
federalism and non-delegation principles that underlie the
presumption against pre-emption.15 8 Thus, Justice Stevens
dissented because neither the FMVSS nor the enabling
statute expressed an intent to pre-empt a common-law tort
action and because the Court extended implied pre-
emption too far. 9
V. ANALYSIS
This note asserts that Justice Stevens's approach to pre-
emption was the better approach, but nonetheless inaccu-
rate in some respects. This note also asserts that the
Court overlooked the underlying administrative issues and
as a result incorrectly analyzed the pre-emption of a com-
mon-law tort action by an administrative regulation. A
more amenable and fair analysis would result if the Court
would first address whether Congress delegated the power
to the DOT to promulgate binding rules that could pre-
empt a common-law tort action. Secondly, if the Court
found that the DOT did indeed have the appropriate dele-
gation, the Court should then address whether formal no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings were appropri-
ate for the FMVSS 208 pre-emption provision. Third, the
Court should then address the most prevalent issue of
whether under the presumption against pre-emption, an
administrative standard, not a congressional statute or leg-
islative rule, can pre-empt a common-law tort claim. If
these questions were answered affirmatively in favor of
156. Geier, 529 U.S. at 911 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens is
most likely referring to Skidmore weak deference where the administrative
standard would be "entitled to respect," but only to the extent that [it is]
persuasive. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 577 (2000)
(citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
157. Geier, 529 U.S. at 912 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 912-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Honda, then the Court's holding would have been more
substantial.
A. Did the DOT Have the Proper Delegation by Congress to
Create Binding Rules?
Before addressing whether Congress intended an agency
interpretation to bind the courts, a court must decide
whether Congress intended to delegate to the agency the
power to attach binding effect to the particular format
used.16 0 Courts can struggle with finding delegatory intent
and must sometimes look to inferential evidence when di-
rect evidence of the intent is not manifest. 161  Unfortu-
nately, the strict requirement of delegation is sometimes
skipped over pursuant to Chevron."6 2 Under Chevron, when
a court cannot find delegatory intent, the delegation is as-
sumed because of the "gap" of statutory silence or ambigu-
ity.1" However, under the non-delegation doctrine," Con-
gress delegates its powers to an agency under carefully
controlled conditions with a clear expression of these con-
ditions in the enabling act. 165
160. Robert A. Anthony, "Interpretive" Rules, "Legislative" Rules, and
"Spurious" Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 1, 5 (1994).
161. See id.
162. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
163. Id. See also Marshall, supra note 75, at 263 (1998) (arguing Chev-
ron deference should not apply in regulatory pre-emption cases). But see
Geier, 529 U.S. at 912 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Christenson, 529 U.S.
at 587 arguing that "an interpretation contained in a [legal brief], not one
arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment
rulemaking[,] . . . do[es] not warrant Chevron-style deference").
164. BERNARD ScHwARTz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 43-44 (3rd Ed. 1991)
(quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989), "The non-
delegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of the separation of powers,"
which "mandate[s] that Congress ... cannot delegate its legislative power to
another branch.").
165. WILLIAM F. Fox JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 22 (2d ed.
1992). See also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n., Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001)
(delineating the rules for delegation by stating "when Congress confers deci-
sion-making authority upon agencies Congress must lay down by legislative
act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act]
is directed to conform").
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In analyzing a delegation, the Court should look to see if
Congress provided sufficient standards to guide the
agency's exercise of delegated power. 66 The overall pur-
pose is to ensure that "important choices of social policy
are made by Congress, the branch of our Government most
responsive to the popular will."6 7 As such, the Majority ac-
knowledged that Congress delegated the power to the DOT
to implement the NTMVS of 1966, but the Court failed to
complete the analysis.'6 8 The Court should have looked
back to the enabling statute. 169
Upon looking at the NTMVS, the first inquiry is whether
Congress delegated the power to the Secretary of Transpor-
tation (Secretary) to promulgate rules that pre-empt com-
mon-law. The Enabling Act delegates to the Secretary the
general responsibility of promulgating safety standards
under the NTMVS.170 The Secretary commented that he in
fact had the power to promulgate safety standards that
pre-empt state law.171 In response, Justice Stevens quoted
Executive Order 12612 stating, "[w]hen an Executive de-
partment or agency proposes to act through adjudication
or rulemaking to pre-empt state law, the department or
agency shall provide all affected States notice and an op-
portunity for appropriate participation in the proceed-
ings. 1172 Although this executive order, previously enacted
by President Reagan, was revoked by President Clinton, the
Secretary's self-proclamation still seems to be a stretch
under the non-delegation doctrine. That doctrine requires
166. ScHwARTZ, supra note 164, at 46.
167. Id. (quoting Industrial Dep't. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
168. Geier, 529 U.S. at 883.
169. 15 U.S.C. § 1392 (2000).
170. 49 U.S.C.A. § 105(b) (West 1998) ("The head of the Administration
is the Administrator who is appointed by the President, by and with the ad-
vice of and consent of the Senate."); 49 U.S.C.A. § 105 (c)(1) (West 1998)
("The administrator shall carry out - duties and powers vested in the Secre-
tary by chapter 4 of title 23 123 U.S.C.S. §§ 410 et seq]"); 49 U.S.C.A. §
30111 (West 2000) ("The Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe motor
vehicle safety standards. Each standard shall be practicable, meet the need
for motor vehicle safety, and be stated in objective terms.").
171. Geier, 529 U.S. at 910 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 912-13
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that there be specific intent for delegation.'7 3 The power of
pre-emption over such a valuable right as the ability to sue
on a common-law tort assumes a great deal, considering
that Congress did not expressly delineate the power to the
Agency.
The Majority did not address this issue because they be-
lieved that Congress delegated the power to the DOT to
promulgate the standard, and that the DOT acted reasona-
bly in its promulgation of the 1984 version of the stan-
dard.174  Expert opinions vary on the current state of the
non-delegation doctrine, 115 and this article does not favor or
disfavor the doctrine, it merely suggests that the Court re-
view whether important policy decisions are in fact made
by the right people. If a policy judgment is made which
denies citizens the right to retrieve redress for injuries, that
decision should be made by Congress, and not by the Sec-
retary of Transportation. 176
B. Notice-and-comment Rulemaking
Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA or
Section 553)177 requires that, in order for a federal regula-
tion or agency rule, 17 herein called legislative rules, to be
binding, it must be promulgated in a public notice-and-
comment proceeding. 179 If the rule is not promulgated by
173. Exec. Order No. 13132, 64 Fed. Reg. 153 (Aug. 4, 1999).
174. Geier, 529 U.S. at 883.
175. Whitman, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (upholding the delegation of the
EPA in setting "air quality standards"). See also id. at 916 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (inviting the chance to reconsider whether the delegation doc-
trine is in line with the Founders' understanding of separation of powers).
176. Geier, 529 U.S. at 911-12; Medtronic, 516 U.S. at 512 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (stating that "[ilt is not certain that an agency regulation de-
termining the pre-emptive effect of any federal statute is entitled to defer-
ence.").
177. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
178. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988). A rule is "the whole or part of an agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organiza-
tion, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency ....
179. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988). For the promulgation of a valid rule, there
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notice-and-comment proceedings, then courts should not
impose these rules as mandatory obligations or standards
on the public. 8 ° Rules that do not bind are called "inter-
pretive rules."' 81 These rules take the form of policy state-
ments,1 8 2 (the interpretive rule at issue in Geier), guidances,
manuals, circulars, bulletins, and memoranda.1 83 Interpre-
tive rules should merely explain and not add to the law
that exists. '84
Although neither the Majority nor the dissent mentioned
it, the NTMVS has its own rulemaking provisions. 85 Under
section 2502, there are specific provisions for the notice
element, 186 comment,'87 and rule promulgation. In fact, the
statute also states that "the Secretary is not required to fol-
low such notice with a notice of proposed rulemaking if the
Secretary determines on the basis of such advanced notice
and the comments received thereon should not be taken
under the provision of the [Act]." 188 Congress also wrote
that the Secretary, as part of any action taken under sec-
tion 2502, may amend any standard or create a new stan-
are three steps that must be satisfied: (1) notice must be given to the af-
fected parties of the agency's intent to publish a rule; (2) solicitation of
comments from all interested persons; (3) a concise and general statement
of the basis and purpose of the rule.
180. Geier, 529 U.S. at 912 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Para-
lyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L. P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (holding "[t]o allow an agency to make a fundamental change in its
interpretation of a substantive regulation without notice and comment ob-
viously would undermine those APA requirements"); Anthony, supra note
160, at 1315 (advancing the theory that agencies should observe legislative
rulemaking for any action that is to impose obligations or standards on pri-
vate parties).
181. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATYRNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL
ON THE ADMINISTRATWE PROCEDURE AcT 30 n.3 (1947). Interpretive rules are
defined as "rules or statements issued by an agency to advise the public of
the agency's construction of the statutes and rules it administers."
182. Anthony, supra note 160, at 1315. The Administrative Procedure
Act includes all these interpretive statements as "policy statements."
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Authorization Act
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dard.'89 Thus, the statute creates some ambiguity as to
whether an amendment must really go through notice-and-
comment rulemaking. Nevertheless, the agency properly
complied with section 553 in the past when amending
rules and did in fact follow section 553 when promulgating
FMVSS 208.190
Justice Stevens argued that "we should be quite reluc-
tant to find pre-emption based on the Secretary's informal
effort to recast the 1984 version of the Standard 208 into a
pre-emptive mode."'91 On the whole, the dissent was trou-
bled by the informality of FVSS 208's promulgation, pro-
claiming that a standard promulgated in such an inconsis-
tent matter should not pre-empt common-law tort
actions. 192 Although the indecisiveness of the DOT's secre-
taries demonstrates that the agency could not settle on a
scheme of regulation, it is still clear that when the agency
amended the rules, the Secretary followed the notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedure. 193 Justice Stevens wants
the Secretary to put his pre-emptive position through for-
mal notice-and-comment rulemaking, but this argument is
fruitless here because, as the Majority stated, nowhere in
implied pre-emption has the Court ever required an ex-
press pre-emption provision.'9 4 As a result, the notice-and-
comment rulemaking argument was a poor one.
189. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Authorization Act
of 1991 § 2502, 49 U.S.C. § 30101 (1994).
190. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass's. of the United States v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34-36 (1983).
191. Id. See also Greve, supra note 7, at 3 (summarizing Steven's ob-
servations in writing, "the pre-emptive policy is cobbled together by the
Court from the convoluted history of air-bag and seat-belt regulation, the
likely effects of tort suits on the dispersion of air-bag technology, inferences
from the secretary's explanation accompanying the standard and the federal
government's litigation position").
192. Geier, 529 U.S. at 890-92.
193. 49 C.F.R. § 571 (1984); see also 49 C.F.R. § 28962 (1984) (amend-
ing Standard 208 to require installation of automatic restraints in all new
cars beginning with 1990 models).
194. Geier, 529 U.S. at 885 (quoting Justice Breyer's statement: "To in-
sist on a specific agency intent to pre-empt made after notice-and-comment
rulemaking would be in certain cases to tolerate conflicts that an agency,
and therefore Congress, is most unlikely to have intended.").
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C. Pre-emption Analysis
In Geier, the Supreme Court held that a regulatory stan-
dard could impliedly pre-empt a common-law tort action. 195
The Court's analysis in reaching the decision was unortho-
dox, to say the least. The Court found that the NTMVS
section 1392(d) and section 1392(k) created a neutral pol-
icy, thereby eliminating the possibility of express pre-
emption. 196 However, the Court still found that the FMVSS
208 impliedly pre-empted common-law tort actions be-
cause it was an "obstacle" to the objectives of the stan-
dard.1 97 This section will analyze each of the Court's find-
ings individually.
The Majority correctly dismissed the possibility of ex-
press pre-emption, but Justice Stevens conducted the bet-
ter analysis by looking to the statute for a specific intent to
pre-empt. Whether under the plain or ordinary meaning, 9 8
the savings clause states that, "[c]ompliance with a motor
vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does
not exempt a person from liability at common-law." 199
Clearly, the provision states that common-law tort actions
are not to be pre-empted. 20  Additionally, nowhere in the
pre-emption provision does it explicitly state that common-
law tort actions are prohibited.2 °' In Medtronic, the Court
also eliminated the possibility of express pre-emption, but
for a wholly different reason.20 2 The Court ruled out ex-
press pre-emption because the purpose of the Medical De-
vice Amendment of 1976 was to assure consumer protec-
tion.20 3 Likewise, Congress enacted the NTMVS to protect
195. Id. at 885-86.
196. Id. at 862.
197. Id. at 886.
198. Peter W. Schroth, Language and Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 17, 26
(1998) (defining ordinary meaning as a mechanical application of the "ordi-
nary meaning"); (differentiating ordinary meaning from plain meaning in
that plain meaning refers more to the "the sense [the] expression usually
has in such contexts" while ordinary meaning requires a lack of ambiguity).
199. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(k) (2000).
200. Geier, 529 U.S. at 897-98.
201. Supra text accompanying note at 98.
202. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
203. Id.
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passengers, but the Court obviously did not feel compelled
to follow Medtronic or Congress's intent when they promul-
gated the rule.2 °4
Justice Stevens's dissent was also more amenable be-
cause it called for a rededication to the presumption
against pre-emption. °5 Since its inception in 1947, the
presumption against pre-emption has demanded that Con-
gress expressly state its purpose if the historic police pow-
ers of the state are to be superceded. 2°6 Health and welfare
laws continue to be two important areas under the protec-
tion of the states' historic police powers. °7 Irreconcilably,
the Court adhered to the presumption in Medtronic, 208 but
ignored the presumption in Geier, allowing implied pre-
emption, claiming that a common-law tort action conflicted
with the objectives of the administrative standard. °9
The Majority in Geier revealed the Court's stance on the
presumption by failing to address it. 210 Previously, in Cip-
pollone, the Court at least gave "lip service" to the pre-
sumption issue before disregarding it, arguably doing more
damage to the presumption than any other case.21' In a
similar fashion, the Geier Court ignored the requirement of
203 Geier, 529 U.S. at 896.
205. Id. at 907 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
207. Raeker-Jordan, supra note 24, at 1468-69 (arguing that the cause
of the weakening of the presumption against pre-emption is three-fold: the
Court (1) "refused to erect a bar to implied pre-emption even in cases in
which Congress has explicitly spoken to the pre-emption question; (2) in-
fused its express pre-emption analysis with implied pre-emption principles
such that there appears to be little distinction between the two 'types' of
pre-emption; (3) seemingly placed no limits on 'obstruction of purposes' im-
plied pre-emption").
208. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485.
209. Geier, 529 U.S. at 885.
210. Id. at 864-86.
211. Cippollone v. Liggett, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1991). See also
Raeker-Jordan, supra note 24, at 1416 (holding that on its face the Cippol-
lone decision required express congressional intent to pre-empt, but in ac-
tuality, the Court found pre-emption in the absence of express language by
Congress); Viet D. Dinh, Whose Call is it? Supreme Court Should Rethink
Pre-emption Law, 22 LEGAL TIMES Vol. 29 (Dec. 6, 1999) (arguing that the
Court should get rid of the presumption against pre-emption because the
Court will rely on the presumption in express pre-emption, but not in ob-
stacle pre-emption).
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a clear statement of congressional intent, failing to even lay
out the full rule from Rice.212 As a result, the application of
the presumption is now uncertain because the Court is
willing to rely on the presumption for express provisions,
but not obstacle provisions.2 13 This is exemplified in Geier
by the Court failing to find pre-emption under the express
provision of FMVSS 208, but finding for pre-emption under
obstacle pre-emption analysis. 211 This skewed analysis,
unless corrected, will negatively affect many pre-emption
cases in the future.
V. IMPACT
A. Effect on Tort Litigation
Prior to the Court hearing the Geier case, Professor Rob
Leflar of the University of Arkansas Law School com-
mented, "Plaintiffs fear that a pro-pre-emption holding in
Geier [will] undermine a vast domain of state tort law." 215
In the wake of the lower courts' heavy reliance on Cippol-
lone to decide pesticide, boat safety and other consumer
products cases, the plaintiffs have a valid right to worry.21
Geier will do as much or more damage to common-law tort
actions as Cippollone did.217
The Court was not always adverse to plaintiffs in com-
mon-law tort pre-emption cases.218 In Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee, the estate of Karen Silkwood sued, under Okla-
212. Cippollone, 505 U.S. at 518.
213. Dinh, supra note 211, at 3. See also Raeker-Jordan, supra note
24, at 1382 (concluding that absent the clear and unambiguous pre-
emptive language, state common-law-damage actions for automobile design
defects or state tort remedies against manufacturers cannot be precluded).
214. Geier, 529 U.S. at 881.
215. Id.
216. See infra pgs. 20-21 and notes 232-34.
217. Marcia Coyle, Pre-emption Case Set for Court: Does Federal Law
Block Common-Law Suits Over Air Bags?, 22 N.J.L.J. No. 16, 2 (Dec. 13,
1999).
218. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
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homa common-law principles, the Kerr-McGee power plant
for contamination injuries resulting from the escape of plu-
tonium at its factory."' The jury awarded Silkwood
$505,000 in actual damages and ten million dollars in pu-
nitive damages.22 ° The court of appeals reversed the puni-
tive damages award, holding that the award was pre-
empted by federal nuclear law.22 Writing for the Majority,
Justice White reversed the appellate court's holding, rea-
soning that in the absence of indication that Congress in-
tended to foreclose common-law tort actions, "[ilt is difficult
to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove
all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal
conduct."22 2 The Court also noted that common-law tort
claims might still be foreclosed if such claims frustrated
"[tlhe objectives of federal law."22 ' Nonetheless, the Court
was willing to award common-law tort remedies even in the
face of a strong pre-emption defense.2 24
Unfortunately, the Court in Cippollone reformulated the
plaintiff-friendly pre-emption analysis from Silkwood.22 5 As
a result, Cippollone now stands as "[a] mandate to disman-
tle the protections of state tort law."22 6 In a similar fashion
as Cippollone, the Geier decision has once again weakened
plaintiffs in common-law tort suits. 227  Justice Stevens
foresaw this problem in Geier, warning that, "the Suprem-
acy Clause does not give unelected federal judges carte
blanche to use federal law as a means of imposing their
219. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 243.
220. Id. at 245.
221. Id. at 246.
222. Id. at 251.
223. Id. at 256.
224. Id. at 258.
225. Id. at 279.
226. Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Pre-emption of Tort Claims as
the Government Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 903, 904 (1996)
(arguing that Cippollone has been misread to provide a defense that would
"[a]bsolve a company of liability only upon a showing of compliance with a
relevant safety requirements").
227. Cippollone, 505 U.S. at 544 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackman foreshadowed Justice Stevens's dissent in Geier by stating, "[tihe
decision today eliminates a critical component of the States' traditional abil-
ity to protect the health and safety of their citizens." Id.
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own ideas of tort reform on the States."228 Geier provides
that not only will a victim who is injured in an area which
federal law occupies receive no redress through the use of
common-law tort actions, but judges will have the ability to
continue weakening the states historic police powers." 9 If
Congress continues to increasingly regulate many facets of
life, victims may soon have nowhere to turn.
Pre-emption of common-law tort actions, "[mlay at times
restrict a state's right to regulate and protect its citizens. "230
This is already evidenced in the boating accidents area.23 '
Despite a number of gruesome injuries and deaths, the
courts have consistently held that common-law suits based
on negligence and products liability are pre-empted by the
Federal Boat and Safety Act (FBSA) of 197 1.232 Much akin
to the FMVSS, Congress also included a savings clause in
the FBSA that precluded the pre-emption of common-law
actions.23 3 However, like in the automobile safety restraint
area, courts have refused to honor the savings clause in
implied pre-emption cases in this area. 34 Clearly, the pre-
clusion of common-law tort suits against boating and
228. Geier, 529 U.S. at 894 (italics omitted).
229. Grey, supra note 14, at 562-63 (arguing that the Court's inconsis-
tency in pre-emption decisions has confused the lower courts). See also
Noah, supra note 226, at 904 (quoting Judge Jack Weinstein from an opin-
ion one month after Cippollone where he cautioned, "that too ready a ten-
dency to declare the state protective shield replaced by the still somewhat
spotty federal protections will leave many injured persons without re-
course." (quoting Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128, 1132
(E.D.N.Y. 1992)).
230. Amy P. Chiang, The Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 and Propeller
Strike Injuries: An Unexpected Exercise in Federal Pre-emption, 68 FORDHAM
L. REv. 487, 524 (1999).
231. Id.
232. 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 4301-11 (West 1994). See also Chiang, supra note
230, at 489. The Court granted certiorari in Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 522
U.S. 978 (1997), to consider the pre-emption issue, but the sides settled be-
fore the Court heard the case.
233. 46 U.S.C.A. § 4311(g) (West 1994).
234. Chiang, supra note 230, at 489. Most recently, in Lady v. Neal
Glaser Marine, Inc., 228 F.3d 598, 615 (5th Cir. 2000), the Fifth Circuit held
that the plaintiffs state common-law tort actions were impliedly pre-empted
despite the savings Clause. The court acknowledged the savings clause's
actual use in saving some common-law suits, but decided that the case was
not appropriate. Id.
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automobile manufacturers is a bad sign of things to come.
Arthur H. Bryant of the Association of Trial Lawyer's for
Public Justice and head counsel for Geier, remarked that
Congress stated:
Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle
safety standard does not exempt any person
from any liability under common-law. That
ought to end the analysis. If the Supreme
Court says pre-emption can be found when
Congress has been this clear, then the whole
area is wide open for the elimination of tort
law whenever the federal government regu-
lates.235
If courts refuse to honor states' right to protect their citi-
zens, congressional statutes protecting common-law tort
actions, and completely disregard the holdings of Medtronic
and Silkwood, plaintiffs will receive no restitution for inju-
ries suffered.
B. Employers Will be Relieved of Tort Suits.
As a direct result of the Court's favoritism of the pre-
emption defense, manufacturers can rest assured that
common-law tort actions stemming from automobile safety
devices will be precluded.23 The likely impact of the Geier
decision was not what was originally intended from FMVSS
208.237 During the House of Representatives debates on
the House version of the Transportation Bill, Tom Triplett,
an attorney from South Carolina, surmised about the po-
tential harmful effects of a bill without a savings clause.238
He states:
We need a traffic safety agency and we need to
research our problem from end to end, but we
235. Coyle, supra note 4, at 3.
236. Michael Hoenig, More Pre-emption of Air-Bag Restraint Claims, 224
N.Y.L.J. 3 (2000) (writing that Geier forecloses the floodgate of litigation the
manufacturers could have faced considering that there are millions of cars
on the roads and plenty of accidents).
237. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 906 (2000)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
238. Brief for Petitioner at 29 (No. 98-1811) (1999 WL 966532).
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don't need to relieve the manufacturer of his
natural responsibility for the performance of
his product. You may think that the manu-
facturer is afraid of Government regulation
but the cry you are hearing may be "Brer Fox,
please don't throw me in the briar patch." If
the Government assumes the responsibility of
safety design in our vehicles, the manufactur-
ers will join together for another 30-year
snooze under the veil of Government sanction
and in thousands of courtrooms across the
Nation wronged individuals will encounter the
stone wall of "Our Product meets government
standards," and an already compounded prob-
lem will be recompounded.23 9
Although the finished NTMVS did contain a savings
clause and this Court refused to honor the savings clause,
Mr. Triplett's prediction could very well come true. Manu-
facturers in the automobile24 ° and boating24 ' industries
have both achieved great success in the courtroom in the
past and will most likely continue to enjoy the same suc-
cess in the future.242
C. Presumption Against Pre-emption
By weakening the presumption against pre-emption, the
Court has once again given the lower courts free reign to
find in favor of the manufacturers in common-law tort
suits.243 The Framers feared that a national legislature
239. Id.
240. Geier, 529 U.S. at 866 (writing "[aill of the Federal Circuit Courts
that have considered the question, however, have found pre-emption").
241. See e.g., Carstensen v. Brunswick Corp., 49 F.3d 430, 432 (9th
Cir. 1995); Moss v. Outboard Marine Corp., 915 F. Supp. 183, 187 (E.D.
Cal. 1996); Shield v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 822 F. Supp. 81, 84 (D. Conn.
1993). See also Chiang, supra note 230, at 32.
242. Hoenig, supra note 236 (writing that three recent federal circuit
court decisions "show that Geier wields influence beyond pure 'no-air-bag'
allegations and, further, that those lawyers seeking to question a manufac-
turer's choice among restraint options authorized by the federal motor vehi-
cle safety standard need to consider the realities of the pre-emption issue at
the outset").
243. Geier, 529 U.S. at 907-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Grey,
supra note 14, at 540 (stating that the presumption against pre-emption
207
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could consume the rights of states, and some believe the
fear has been realized as a result of the expanding congres-
sional power and pre-emption defense.244 What is clear is
that the presumption against pre-emption no longer holds
weight with the current Court.2 4 5
The concern about the disappearance of the presumption
against pre-emption is especially significant when analyz-
ing the pre-emptive effect of an administrative standard.24 6
If the Court can find the express language and intent mani-
fested in FMVSS 208 without fully exploring the agency's
rulemaking power or delegatory power to pre-empt, the
Court will be able to find pre-emption anywhere.247 Justice
Stevens reminded the Court that in administrative regula-
tions, "we generally, 'expect an administrative regulation to
declare any intention to pre-empt state law with some
specificity.'" 248  By its complicated nature, implied pre-
switched to a presumption for pre-emption).
244. Schroth, supra note 198 (arguing that the Court should get rid of
the presumption against pre-emption because the Court is not relying on
the presumption in obstacle pre-emption). But see Susan J. Stabile, Pre-
emption of State Law by Federal Law: A Task for Congress or the Courts?, 40
VILL. L. REv. 1, 73 (1995) (criticizing the use of the presumption against pre-
emption for only analyzing the intent of the statute and not the balancing of
state and federal interests).
245. The Supreme Court 1999 Term Leading Cases, 114 HARv. L. REv.
339 (2000) (writing that "Geier signals the Court's subtle drift away from the
presumption against pre-emption in favor of a more functional federal law
preference rule."). The functional federal law preference is the Court's find-
ing of pre-emption in cases in which a federal agency (experts) has promul-
gated a "uniform national standard" which can adequately replace the state
laws. Id. at 349.
246. Raeker-Jordan, supra note 24, at 1426 (discussing the difference
between state regulatory actions and state common-law actions). This dif-
ference is not really relevant for this case. The Majority agreed in Geier.
Justice Breyer wrote that a narrow reading must be given to the standard
because under a broad reading state legislation or regulations might be pre-
empted. Geier, 529 U.S. at 868. This would include the pre-emption of non-
identical state statutes concerning the same areas of law. Id.
247. Geier, 529 U.S. at 908-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 908 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Exec. Order 12612,
52 Fed. Reg. 41685 (Oct. 30, 1987, revoked Aug. 4, 1999) (laying out special
requirements for pre-emption: "Executive departments and agencies shall
construe.., a Federal statute to preempt State law only when the statute
contains an express preemption provision or there is some other firm and
palpable evidence compelling the conclusion that the Congress intended
preemption of State law.").
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emption does not demand a clearly manifested intent.249
However, for the "presumption against pre-emption" to
have teeth, the Court should examine implied pre-emption
cases as stringently as it does in express cases, especially
when analyzing the pre-emptive effect of an administrative
standard." ° Because the Court does not seem willing to
use the strict standard of statutory analysis, the presump-
tion is no longer a valid impediment to pre-emption.25 1 The
current Court disregarded the presumption, and until the
make-up of the Court changes or the analysis changes, the
presumption is essentially worthless. 5 2
D. A Potential Clash With FederalisrrL
In stressing that Geier was about federalism, Justice
Stevens directly attacked the Majority's apparent hypocrisy
between the pre-emption and federalism doctrines.25 3 Over
the last decade, the Court, cloaked in its federalist regalia,
reshaped constitutional law in many areas.2 54 However, in
a surprising turn of events, the Court decided the four pre-
emption cases from last term in favor of the federal gov-
ernment.2 55  One commentator surmised that, "[p]re-
emption law is on a collision course with the conservative
249. See supra notes 18-21.
250. Greve, supra note 7, at 3. The Majority defends its position that
requiring an official indication of intent to pre-empt would "tolerate conflicts
that an agency, and therefore Congress, is most unlikely to have intended."
Id. Greve attacks this reasoning by questioning how pre-emptive authority
that an agency assumes under statutory provisions can be attributed to
Congress. The presumption against pre-emption demands that specific in-
tent be evident in the language of the statute in order to pre-empt a com-
mon-law action. Id. This intent would be evident in the explicit words writ-
ten by Congress. Id.
251. Coyle, supra note 217, at 3.
252. Raeker-Jordan, supra note 24, at 1379. See also Geier, 529 U.S.
at 864 (forming the Majority was Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Breyer, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy).
253. Geier, 529 U.S. at 887.
254. Robert L. Glicksman & Stephen R. McAllister, Federal Environ-
mental Law in the "New" Federalism Era, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 11122, 1 (2000)
(discussing the Court's pursuit of federal pre-emption); See also Exec. Order
No. 12612, supra note 248 (explaining President Reagan's favoritism for the
presumption against pre-emption).
255. See Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 771.
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justices' celebrated project to re-establish structural Con-
stitutional principles on federalism.""' Professor and Dean
of the University of California, Los Angeles, Law School,
Jonathan Varat, construes the issue differently, surmising
that "there is more to predicting the stance of individual
members of the Court than to ask each what his or her
general predisposition is towards the salience of the gen-
eral roles of the State and Nation in our federalist struc-
ture."2 57 Varat hypothesized that the Court may be more
likely to find federal pre-emption than one might think. 5
Nonetheless, the Majority was not compelled to defend any
apparent inconsistencies, but may be forced to reconcile
the two competing doctrines in the near future.
Another direct result of the Court's apparent inconsis-
tency in its federalist's analysis, is demonstrated in the
strange make-up of the majority and minority decisions in
Geier.2"9 The unusual make-up of the two sides demon-
strates that the votes in the next pre-emption case could be
up for grabs.2"' For instance, Thomas departed from Jus-
tice Scalia and the other conservatives while Justice Breyer
left his liberal brethren.2 61 The departures were quite un-
usual because the more liberal justices262 typically favor
federalism in pre-emption cases, but oppose federalism on
256. Greve, supra note 7, at 1. But see Paul D. Clement & Viet D.
Dinh, There's No Conflict in Interpreting Commerce Clause Despite Stevens's
Claim, FULTON CouNTY DAILY REPoRT, Jun. 20, 2000, at 3 (claiming that Geier
was not about federalism, but rather about congressional intent).
257. Jonathan D. Varat, Federalism and Preemption in October Term
1999, 28 PEPP. L. REv. 1, 10 (2001).
258. Id.
259. Geier, 529 U.S. at 887.
260. Varat, supra note 257, at 3.
261. Geier, 529 U.S. at 864, 886. See also Clement, supra note 256, at
3 (hypothesizing that Thomas thinks that Congress exceeds its delegated
power under the Commerce Clause much of time and as a result the pre-
sumption against pre-emption is another way to invalidate these laws). As
for Justice Breyer, Dinh states that Breyer might be advocating a pro-
federal government stance. Id. at 4. Jonathan Varat agrees with both of
these assessments. Varat, supra note 257. However, he further concludes
that Thomas is the most consistently state-power oriented justice and is in
fact in favor of limiting the pre-emptive effect of federal statutes. Id.
262. The liberal wing of the Court includes Justices Stevens, Breyer,
Souter, and Ginsburg.
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most other constitutional issues.2 63 Professor Varat com-
mented on the strange split:
Because federal preemption of state law elimi-
nates one source of regulation, just as rulings
that Congress or the States lack constitutional
power to regulate a particular field or subject
do, those Justices inclined to curtail congres-
sional power, under the Constitution may not
be inclined, when congressional power is
clear, to interpret the preemptive intent of
Congress narrowly in favor of preserving con-
current, or dual, state regulation.2 "4
If the current balance of the Court is disrupted by re-
tirement or change in ideology, perhaps the presumption
against pre-emption could regain its initial forcefulness.
Until then, advocates for the presumption against pre-
emption and plaintiffs' rights will continue to lose the day.
VI. CONCLUSION
Commentators deemed Geier v. American Honda Motor
Co., Inc. one of the most important cases of the 1999
term.2 6 5 These commentators were right as the case not
only changed the method of analysis for pre-emption, but
in doing so infringed on many plaintiffs' rights, leaving
them with no forum for relief. The Court concluded that
even in the absence of an express intent to pre-empt,
courts are free to hold that administrative standards pre-
empt common-law tort actions. In decreasing the states'
historic police powers, victims of serious injuries could now
be foreclosed from receiving any remedy when a federal
regulation or standard occupies an area of law. Manufac-
turers can breathe a sigh of relief as hundreds of pending
design defect lawsuits involving lap belts, shoulder har-
nesses and airbags will now be foreclosed. As inequitable
as the Geier decision is, it seems only fair that in the near
future, the Court's decision to expand pre-emption in favor
263. Greve, supra note 7, at 3.
264. Varat, supra note 257, at 10.
265. Coyle, supra note 217, at 1.
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of administrative agencies could cause a major inconsis-
tency in the Majority's federalist's agenda. Only time will
tell.
